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DIRECTOR'S POWER TO COMPETE WITH HIS
CORPORATION
RICHARD M. RAMSEY*
The scope of this paper, in so far as possible, will be
confined to the strict conception of competition as it is
involved in the law governing transactions in which a director or manager' of a corporation endeavors to obtain for
himself business opportunities which might or would prove
advantageous to the corporation. Stated directly, the problem may arise from any business transaction with a third
person in which the corporation is interested. Only in so far
as it contributes to clarity and completeness of treatment
will the rules of law governing interlocking directorates or
business contracts and transactions with the principal corporation be considered.
The main purpose is to look into the restrictions placed
upon a corporate director's or manager's freedom to engage
in personal business activities, and the reasons behind those
restrictions. In this respect, it is well to bear in mind that
the problem as well as the solution the courts have found is
another of the outgrowths of conflicting motivity so common
to modern complex society. In such a situation as this, it
should be the purpose of the law to arrive as nearly as
possible at a complete balance of economic advancement and
justice to all parties in interest. On one side is the position
of trust and confidence which a director of a corporation
holds and the reliance that the stockholders must of necessity
place in him. On the other side, however, there is freedom
of enterprise concept and the proposition that by placing
too great a restriction upon the freedom of corporation directors, competent men would be discouraged from accepting
directorships.
There are few decisions directly limiting the competitive
activity of corporate directors. These few cases, however,
have resulted in an abundance of talk on the part of the
judges and the suggestion of rules which, if carried to their
logical conclusion would produce indefensible results. The
*
1.
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The courts do not in this field clearly distinguish directors from
other officers.
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actual decisions, however, are for the most part quite satisfactory.
The large corporation has seldom appeared in litigation
of the question, and the cases have generally involved the
small or so-called "closed" corporation. From this and other
circumstances, one writer goes so far as to conclude that
effective supervision over the directors of large corporations
2
is impracticable.
The director of a corporation in the course of his ordinary duties is strictly speaking neither an agent nor a
trustee. The same factors, however, which lead to judicial
condemnation of certain conduct of agents and trustees is
sometimes applicable to corporate directors.3 The courts
generally refer to this abstractly as a "fiduciary relation."
In addition the rule that the failure of the directors to conduct the affairs of the corporation with diligence and care
renders them liable to the corporation for negligent misman4
agement.
There is no question as to the director's right to engage in a business which is not at the time competitive with
that of the corporation,5 nor that, after his relation as director to the corporation has been terminated, he may enter
into a competitive business provided he does not violate any
contractual dutyG or engage in any unfair competition practices in the nature of using or disclosing trade secrets.7 In
addition, an individual, as a condition of becoming an officer
of a corporation may reserve the right to engage in a similar business at the same time." Likewise, any restrictions
which exist have no application to directors who own all of
the stock,9 except perhaps as creditors of the corporation
might complain."° Beyond this point, the real confusion begins to appear.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See Dodd, Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of
Corporate Managers Practicable? (1935) 2 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 194.
Ballantine, Private Corporations (1927) Sec. 104; Stevens, Corporations (1936) 545.
Spellman, Corporate Directors (1931) 360.
Lancaster Loose Leaf Tobacco Co. v. Robinson, 199 Ky. 313, 250
S.W. 997 (1923).
N.Y. Automobile Co. v. Franklin, 49 Misc. 8, 97 N.Y.S. 781 (1905).
Hall v. Dekker, 45 Cal. App. (2d), 115 P.(2d)15 (1941).
J. J. Dunnegan Const. Co. ex rel. Anderson v. Dunnegan, 217 Iowa
672, 250 N.W. 115 (1933).
McCracken v. Robinson, 57 Fed. 375 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1893).
Millsajbs v. Merchants & Planters Bank, 71 Miss. 361, 13 So. 903
(1893) (by implication).
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Although the problem is essentially the same throughout, the case holdings may be considered for purposes of
clarity under three main heads: (1) Transactions3 with third
persons involving the acquisition or sale of property in
which the corporation might be interested; (2) Engaging
in the same type of business as that in which the corporation
is engaged; (3) A correlation and a consideration of miscellaneous cases.
ACQUISITION OR SALE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WHICH THE
CORPORATION MIGHT BE INTERESTED

The mere fact that a corporation might use certain
property for its benefit, or has a purely abstract interest
therein, is not of itself sufficient to preclude a director from
purchasing it for his own benefit.11 The limitations on his
power of purchase in his own behalf must be looked for in
other circumstances than the mere fiduciary position which
he holds as a director. Thus, the Alabama court in stating
this proposition said,
"Good faith to the corporation does not require of its
officers that they steer from their own to the corporation's
benefit, enterprises or investments, which, though capable
of profits to the corporation, have in no way become subject
12
to their trust or duty."
What circumstances, then, will impose such a "trust"
on the property or "duty" on the director?
The cases hold that a corporation's interest in the
property under a present lease was sufficient, since it had
an expectancy of renewal.13 This expectancy idea was extended by the recent case of News-Journal Corporation v.
Gore4 to include a lot over which the company was necessarily a trespasser in the course of ingression and egression to
11.
12.
13.

Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, 12 Ariz. 245, 100 Pac. 784 (1909); Carper
v. Frost Oil Co., 72 Colo. 345, 211 Pac. 370 (1922).
La Garde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199,
202 (1900).
McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103 (C.C.A. 8th, 1906); La-

Garde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199
(1900); News-Journal Corporation v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 S.(2d)
741 (1941); Acker, Merrall & Condit Co. v. McGaw, 106 Md. 536,

68 Atl. 17 (1907); H. C. Girard Co. v. Lamareux, 277 Mass. 277,
116 N.E. 572 (1917); cf. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164
N.E. 545 (1928); Pikes Peak Co. v. Pfuntner, 158 Mich. 412, 123
N.W. 19 (1909).

14. 147 Fla. 217, 2 S. (2d) 741 (1941).
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their back entrance. The corporate director's fiduciary duty
prevents him from acquiring a property interest which he
knows the corporation must necessarily acquire's or is dependent upon' 6 for the successful prosecution of its corporate purpose. Furthermore he cannot acquire property with
an intent to transfer it to the corporation at a personal profit, 1 7 or use it to defeat the plans of the corporation.' 8

This

last situation might logically, though not necessarily, be extended to the acquisition of property with intent to profit
from competitive bidding between his corporation and a competitor.
Beyond this the courts have refused to go. They have
often stated the rules in broad terms, for example, in Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld"9 the court said,
"Whether in any case an officer of a corporation is in duty
bound to purchase property for the corporation, or to refrain
from purchasing property for himself, depends upon whether
the corporation has an interest, actual or in expectancy, in the
property, or whether the purchase of the property by the officer
or director may hinder or defeat the plans and purposes of the
corporation in carrying on or developing the legitimate business
for which it was created."

In this case, one Steinfeld, while not a director, so dominated the board that the court considered the case as if
he had been a member of it. From certain reports of the
company's superintendent and other sources open to him by
reason of his connection with the company, Steinfeld learned
that neighboring properties were valuable for mining purposes. He bought the properties for his own use. Since
he did not mislead the company by representations that he
15.
16.

17.

18.
19.

Golden Rod Mining Co. v. Buckvich, 108 Mont. 569, 92 P. (2d) 316
(1939).
Farwell v. Pyle-National Electric Headlight Co., 289 Ill. 157, 124
N.E. 449 (1919); Nebraska Power Co. v. Koenig, 93 Neb. 68, 139
N.W. 839 (1913); cf. Tierney v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85
W. Va. 545, 102 S.E. 249 (1920).
Harmony Way Bridge Co. v. Leathers, 353 Ill. 378, 187 N.E. 432
(1933) ; Parks v. Hughes, 145 La. 221, 82 So. 202 (1919); Gilmorev.
Dixmore
cf.
AtI. (1931)
730 (1926);
193,(2d)
123 145
W. 3. Gilmore Drug Co.,Cal27989,Pa.4 P.
Kahle v. Stephens, 214
Golf Club v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 156 N.E. 785 (1927); Bliss Petro102 (1926).
155 N.E.
209,N.W.
N.Y. 237
244 569,
Am. Realty
v. McNally,
Co. v.
Trust Co.
N.Y.
53 (1931);
245Co.,
Mich.
leum
Golden Rod Mining Co. v. Buckvich, 108 Mont. 569, 92 P. (2d) 316
v. Pan American Petroleum & Trans. Co.,
vf.
Blaunstein
(1939);
174 Misc. 601, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 651 (S.C.N.Y.Co. 1940).
12 ArA. 245, 100 Pac. 784, 790 (1909).
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was buying for it, the court held that his purchase was not
in violation to his duty to the company. Likewise, in
Carper v. Frost Oil Company,20 the court held the circumstances insufficient to warrant a finding that the director
had violated his fiduciary duty. Here, the corporation was
organized for the purpose of purchasing, developing, and
operating oil lands in the state of Louisiana. One Malone,
a director, was sent to Louisiana as general manager. While
there, he purchased some oil leases for himself and the president of the corporation in their own names and for their,
personal benefit. In a suit to establish a constructive trust,
and for an accounting, the court held for the defendant, saying,
"When acting in good faith, a director or officer is not
precluded from engaging in distinct enterprises of the same
general class of business as the corporation is engaged in."
In the case of LaGarde v. Anniston Lime and Stone
Company,21 the court also showed its reluctance to burden
directors with fiduciary duties. The situation was that
LaGarde knew that his corporation owned a one-third interest in a certain quarry, leased a second one-third interest,
and had been negotiating for the purchase of the reversion,
and the other one-third interest. The acquisition of the entire quarry would have been of great benefit to the corporation. LaGarde bought the two-thirds interest for his own
account, intending to quarry and sell lime in competition with
the company. The court here held2 2 that the acquisition of
the one-third which the company held under a lease was a
breach of his duty to the corporation since it had an expectancy of renewal. As to the other one-third interest, the
court held that LaGarde was within his legal rights in buying, for although the property would have been valuable to
the company, acquisition of it was not necessary to the company's business, and LaGarde had not been instructed by the
company to buy the property for it. It is noteworthy that
it was considered immaterial that LaGarde gained his knowledge as to the value of the property through his connection
with the company.
The courts have often referred to this so-called "ex20. 72 Colo. 345, 347, 211 Pac. 370, 371 (1922).
21. 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900).
22. Id. at 499, 28 So. at 201.
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pectancy" of renewal, as a property right or in the nature

of a property right belonging to the corporation,2 3 and therefore deserving protection against interference by a director

in his individual capacity. Some of the cases involving patents or copyrights,2 4 contain language suggesting the existence of a special or vested interest. This, however, is
rationalization. No protection in similar situations would be
given against third persons who are not directors. All of
the cases suggesting this proposition can be decided more
easily under conventional theories.
Where the corporation is unable or unwilling to acquire
the property dealt with by the director, the courts generally

protect the director. Thus courts have absolved a director
when the party dealt with had refused to deal with the corporation,25 or the corporation lacked financial ability to seize
the opportunity,2 6 or it would have been ultra vires for the

was not at the time
corporation to act,2 7 or the corporation
28
in the market for the property.
A sale of property by a director in competition with a

beneficial sale by his corporation, has come before the courts
on only one occasion.2 9

In that case, the director owned a

one-acre tract of land adjoining a sixty-five-acre tract owned
by his corporation. A purchaser offered $75,000 for both
23. See Pikes Peak Co. v. Pfuntner, 158 Mich. 412, 123 N.W. 19, 20
(1909); Crittenden & Cowler Co. v. Cowler, 66 App. Div. 95,
72 N.Y.S. 701, 702 (3d Dep't. 1901); Robinson v. Jewett, 116 N.Y.
40, 53 (1899).
24. See Farwell v. Pyle-National Headlight Co., 289 Ill. 157, 167, 124
25.

26.

27.
28.

29.

N.E. 499, 553 (1919); Hussong Dyeing Machine Co. v. Morris, 89
Ati. 249, 250 (N.J. Chanc. 1913).
Jacksonville Cigar Co. v. Dozier, 53 Fla. 1059, 43 So. 523 (1907);
Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. v. Anderson, 168 Miss. 334, 151 So. 161
(1933); Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co. v. Davidson, 95 Mo.
467, 8 S.W. 595 (1888); cf. Crittenden & Cowler Co. v. Cowler, 66
App. Div. 95, 72 N.Y.S. 701 (3d Dep't. 1901) (The court refused
to adopt such a rule because of the danger of collusion between
the third party and the defendant.).
Jasper v. Appalachian Gas Co., 152 Ky. 69, 153 S.W. 50 (1913);
Hannerty v. Standard Theatre Co., 109 Mo. 297, 19 S.W. 82 (1891);
Murray v. Vanderbuilt, 39 Barb. Ch. 140 (N.Y. 1863).
Thilco Timber Co. v. Sawyer, 236 Mich. 401, 210 N.W. 204 (1926).
Carper v. Frost Oil Co., 72 Colo. 345, 211 Pac. 370 (1922); Lawrence
v. Sutton-Zwolle Oil Co., 193 La. 118, 190 So. 351 (1939); Tierney
v. United Pocahontas Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 545, 102 S.E. 249 (1920) ;
See Loewer v. Lonake Rice Milling Co., 111 Ark. 62, 77, 161 S.W.
1042, 1048 (1913); cf. DuPont v. DuPont, 256 Fed. 129, 150 (C.C.A.
3d, 1919) (director's participation in the decision-making of the
corporation).
Dravosburg Land Co. v. Scott, 340 Pa. 280, 16 A (2d) 415 (1940).
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tracts. The defendant refused to sell his tract for less
than $40,000. Rather than lose the $35,000, the corporation
by unanimous consent of the stockholders and directors agreed
to take that amount. The deal was closed. This suit was
brought to have equity compel the defendant to pay over that
amount by which he was unjustly enriched, but the court
found for the defendant, saying,
"No law, outside of eminent domain, compels a person to
part with his property for what other persons, or a court may
regard as sufficient compensation.
"No duty to his company restricted his right to refuse
to sell his land, or, if he sold it at all, to do so only at
a price satisfactory to himself."

This, it would seem, is the desirable and only possible
result, as is substantiated by the absence of cases.
ENGAGING IN THE SAME TYPE OF BUSINESS AS THAT IN

WHICH THE CORPORATION IS ENGAGED
Obviously a director should be permitted to engage in
business activities other than those of the corporation. Equally obvious is the necessity for some limitation:3 upon this
power. Under certain circumstances, he is free to enter an
independent competitive business.30 It is, in fact, the rule
rather than the exception. Thus, in Red Top Cab Company
v. Hanchett the court observed that,
"The directors or officers of a corporation are not, by reason
of the fiduciary relationship they bear toward the corporation,
precluded from entering into an independent business in competition with the corporation.******This general statement, however, is subject to the proviso that directors or officers entering into such competing enterprise must act in good faith and
may not cripple or injure the corporation which they serve."

The last sentence of this quotation, while typical, is
broader than the decisions. Most courts have held a transgressing director liable under a violation of his fiduciary
duties only when his act constitutes a clear abuse of his
30.

31.

Barr v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 51 Fed. 33 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1892);
Carper v. Frost Oil Co., 72 Colo. 345, 211 Pac. 370 (1922); Greer
v. Stannard, 85 Mont. 78, 277 Pac. 622 (1929); N.Y. Automobile
Co. v. Franklin, 49 Misc. 8, 97 N.Y.S. 781 (1905); Detroit Fidelity
& Surety Co. v. First Nat'l. Bank of Wichita Falls, 66 S.W. (2d)
406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
48 F. (2d) 236, 238 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1931).
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position as a director. When such an abuse is shown, the
corporation is entitled not only to damages and recovery of
any profits resulting therefrom, but equity will impound
2
for the benefit of the corporation any property acquired.)
It has been held that if a fiduciary is engaged in a
business in competition with his corporation, he cannot actively use his position and power over his corporation so
as to prevent the corporation from seeking business in competition with himself. 33 That this rule may be extended to
mere dissuasion by one in whom reliance is placed is at least
suggested by the court in Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum and Transportation Company.34 If the director uses
the corporation's personnel, facilities, or finance in obtaining
and developing his business, the corporation is entitled to
the benefits. 35 Nor will a director, in furtherance of his own
personal interests, be permitted to engage in practices of
unfair competition such as the use or disclosure of trade
secrets. 36 It has also been hinted in this respect, that he
will not be permitted to entice away any corporate employees.3
The act of obtaining for himself something in
which the corporation has an expectancy, by reason of a
present interest, also renders a director liable under a breach
of his fiduciary duties, 3 1 as the courts apparently apply the
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

37.
38.

McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103 (C.C.A. 8th, 1906); Hussong Dyeing Machine Co. v. Morris, 89 Atl. 249 (N.J.Ch. 1913).
In re New York Rys. Corp., 82 F. (2d) 739 (C.C.A. 2d, 1936);
Singer v. Carlisle, 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 172, affirmed 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 320
(1940).
174 Misc. 601, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 651, 731 (1940).
Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F. (2d) 236 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1931);
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A. (2d) 503 (Del. 1939); Battle Creek Food
Co. v. Kirkland, 298 Mich. 515, 299 N.W. 167 (1941); Keokuk
Northern Line Packet Co. v. Davidson, 95 Mo. 467, 8 S.W. 545
(1888). But cf. Solimi v. Hollander, 128 N.J. Eq. 228, 16 A. (2d)
203 (1941).
Hall v. Dekker, 45 Cal. App. (2d), 115 P. (2d) 15 (1941); Beaudette
v. Graham, 267 Mass. 7, 165 N.E. 671 (1929); Southwest Pump &
Machine Co. v. Forslund, 225 Mo. App. 262, 29 S.W. (2d) 165
(1930); cf. Witmer v. Arkansas Dailies, Inc., - Ark. -, 151 S. W.
(2d) 971 (1941); Chicago Flexotile Floor Co. v. Lane, 188 Minn.
422, 247 N.W. 517 (1933).
Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F. (2d) 236, 238 (D.C.N.D. Cal.
1931).
LaGarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496 28 So. 199
(1900); Farwell v. Pyle-National Electric Headlight Co., 289 Ill.
157, 124 N.E. 449 (1919); Hussong Dyeing Machine Co. v. Morris,
89 Atl. 249 (N.J. Ch. 1913); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 667
(1940).
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301

doctrine of Meinhard v. Salmon." Similarly, a director can
be prevented from obtaining or using a thing which gains its
value to him by reason of its value to the corporation, that
is, where the director acts with an intent to sell or otherwise
dispose of property, or, through it, a service to the corporation at a profit to himself. 40 Similarly it is a I-reach of duty
for him to use his position as a director or manager to steer
part of the corporation's business 41 or business with the
corporation, 42 through his own enterprise to the detriment
of the company.
The state of the law in situations where the director is
dealing in the corporation's behalf is uncertain.4 3 Of course,
when the director's action constitutes fraud or a violation
of an agency with which he is specifically charged, the corporation may recover, and it seems, in light of the fiduciary
relationship that the same should be extended where the
director actively misleads or conceals from the corporation
the true facts of the situation, 4 but the burden of proof
would undoubtedly be on the corporation.45 Certainly appropriation to himself of a corporate opportunity in the
nature of an offer which was made to thb corporation or
to him in his corporate capacity constitutes a breach of duty.48
39.
40.

249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
Battle Creek Food Co. v. Kirkland, 298 Mich. 515, 299 N.W. 167
(1941); Golden Rod Mining Co. v. Buckvich, 108 Mont. 569, 92 P.
(2d) 316 (1939); Hussong Dyeing Machine Co. v. Morris, 89 AtI. 249
(N.J. Ch. 1913).
41. Coleman v. Hanger, 210 Ky. 309, 275 S.W. 784 (1925).
42. Battle Creek Food Co. v. Kirkland, 298 Mich. 515, 299 N.W. 167
(1941).
43. Compare Golden Rod Mining Co. v. Buckvich, 108 Mont. 569, 92 P.
(2d) 316; Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transportation
Co., 174 Misc. 601, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 651 (1940), with Zeckendorf v.
Steinfeld, 12 Ariz. 245, 100 Pac. 784 (1909). The difficulty arises
from the fact that all the cases involving such a situation have
involved other factors as well. True this can be said of nearly
every case in this field, however, unlike most of the others, these
particular cases have involved other elements which alone were
sufficient to ground the decisions.
44. See cases cited supra note 30.
45. Bay City Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 8 Wash. (2d) 185, 111 P. (2d)
771 (1941).
46. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A. (2d) 503, (Del. 1939); Brite v. Penny, 157
N.C. 110, 72 S.E. 967 (1911); Solimi v. Hollander, 128 N.J.Eq. 228,
16 A. (2d) 203 (1941). But note, the mere fact that an opportunity
would be advantageous to the corporation does not render it a
"corporate opportunity," LaGarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co.,
126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199 (1900); Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v.
Harris, 97 Colo. 309 P. (2d) 429 (1935).
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While constituting a departure from the immediate issue,
it is important to note that a director will not be permitted
to seek a personal profit or advantage from the performance
of a duty owed to the corporation as a director or manager.4 7
In the absence of special circumstances, courts have refused to compel the director to act for the corporation or
not at all on the ground that this would place an unwarranted restriction upon personal business activity. The rule
has been applied even in fields in which the corporation is
48
directly interested.
In the case of Lancaster Loose Leaf Tobacco Company
v. Robinson,49 the plaintiff company was organized for the
purpose of operating a tobacco warehouse, and selling, and
having sold by auctioneers on its floors, tobacco brought for
that purpose by producers and other owners. The corporation had never speculated in tobacco except for an occasional
purchase made on its own floors. Action was brought by
the corporation to recover $24,000, the profits realized upon
the purchase and resale of a large quantity of burley, upon
the theory that as an officer of the corporation, secret profits
made in a business transaction of a nature similar to those
of the corporation should inure to the corporation's benefit.
But the court held in favor of the defendant.
Another early case, Barr v. PittsburghPlate Glass Company5 held that it was proper for a director to purchase
property and engage in a competitive business, and there47.

Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 715, 17
L. Ed. 339 (1862); Ditzler v. Bingham, 309 Ill. App. 581, 33 N.E. 939
(1941); Mason v. Richardson, 262 App. Div. 186, 28 N.Y.S. (2d)
537 (1941); Battle Creek Food Co. v. Kirkland, 298 Mich. 515,
299 N.W. 167 (1941); accord, Drury v. Cross, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
299 (1868).
48. Barr v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 51 Fed. 33 (C.C.W.D. Pa.
1892); LaGarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496,

28 So. 199 (1900); Witmer v. Arkansas Dailies, Inc., 202 Ark. 470,

151 S.W. (2d) 971 (1941); Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris,

97 Colo. 309, 49 P. (2d) 429 (1935); Carper v. Frost Oil Co., 72

Colo. 345, 211 Pac. 370 (1922); Lancaster Loose Leaf Tobacco Co.
v. Robinson, 199 Ky. 313, 250 S.W. 997 (1923); Bliss Petroleum

Co. v. McNally, 254 Mich. 569, 237 N.W. 53 (1931); Greer v.
Stannard, 85 Mont. 78, 277 Pac. 622 (1929); Solhni v. Hollander,

128 N.J.Eq. 228, 16 A. (2d) 203 (1941); Singer v. Carlisle, 26
N.Y.S. (2d) 172, affirmed 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 320 (1940); Litwin v.
Allen, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 667 (1940); N.Y. Automobile Co. v. Franklin,

49 Misc. 8, 97 N.Y.S. 781 (1905); Tierney v. United Pocahontas
Coal Co., 85 W. Va. 545, 1025 S.E. 249 (1920); Detroit Fidelity

& Surety Co. v. Wichita Falls, First National Bank of, 66 S.W.

(2d) 406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
49. M Y.3 313, 250 S.W. 997 (1923).
5. M1k
= {C.CW.D. Pa. 1892) ( affirmed 57 Fed. 86 (C.C.A. 3d,
1w).
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after, when the corporation wished to buy the defendant's
plant, to sell it at a profit in the same way that he might
sell any other property owned by him.
Among the more recent cases, those of Witmer v. Arkansas Dailies, Inc.,51 and Solimi v. Hollander5 2 are outstanding. In the former case, suit was brought seeking an injunction to restrain the defendant, a minority stockholder in
the plaintiff organization from obtaining advertising to be
used in local papers. The defendant had resigned after ten
years as manager, secretary, and treasurer of the plaintiff
corporation and entered business independently. He contacted former patrons of the plaintiff corporation and entered into contracts with them to handle their business
after expiration of present contracts. Throughout, and at
the time of the trial, the defendant remained a nominal
director of the corporation. The court denied the injunction.
In the latter case, the defendant directors of the American Corporation, while still owning all of the stock therein,
exercised an option under a previously entered trust agreement with their father for the purchase of the stock of a
Canadian corporation engaged in an identical business. Suit
was brought by the American- corporation on the grunds
that, (1) this was a corporate opportunity which should
have gone to the American company, (2) the defendants
were prohibited from acquiring the Canadian business because of their fiduciary responsibility to the American company because in the acquisition and development of the opportunity, the assets and facilities of the American company
were employed. But again, the court decided in favor of
the defendants.
Likewise, the fact that a company has negotiated for
property does not preclude the defendant from buying for
his own benefit, even though his knowledge of the property
or its value or its availability was acquired through his
53
relationship to the company.
51.

202 Ark. 470, 151 S.W. (2d) 971 (1941).

52. 126 N.J. Eq. 228, 16 A. (2d) (1941).
53.

LaGarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199
(1900); Holmes v. Doe Run Lead Co., 223 S.W. 772 (Mo. App.
1920); Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Harris, 92 Colo. 309, 49 P.
(2d) 429 (1935).
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A CORRELATION AND CONSIDERATION OF MISCELLANEOUS
CASES
The futility of attempting to separate the problem into
even two broad headings as those here used is easily discernible. The cases themselves often involve both problems. Even an isolated instance of property acquisition,
while alone constituting an act of competition, may point
toward the broader conception of competitive business.
In the light of the cases, it becomes difficult, if not
impossible, to determine the limits of the so-called "fiduciary
duties" or to state accurately the point at which courts will
limit a director's or manager's right to act in his own behalf. However, to pass it off as some have done- is
not helpful.
Although there is much confusion in the field, the greatest difficulty originates from the dicta of the cases. The
decisions themselves are less confusing. By disregarding
misleading dicta and considering the holdings alone, it appears that there is no distinct field, nor set rules, which in
themselves constitute the limits of a corporate director's
power to operate in his own behalf. His power, and the
limits of that power are controlled by the rules of law in
a number of fields in accordance as they become involved
by the factual set-up of the particular case, and not the
so-called fiduciary relationship in and of itself. Thus far,
the cases in this field in which a director has been held to
have violated a duty owing to the corporation, have involved
one or more of the following: agency; unfair competition;
active fraud; waste, negligence, or nonfeasance in office
constituting corporate mismanagement, and the doctrine of
Meinhard v. Salmon.55 Of course, the law of trusts becomes
involved, but only insofar as the courts may construct a
trust in favor of the corporation, provided a case can be
made out in one of the above fields.
The application of the law of agency must be considered
in light of the fact that corporate personality is a recognized
54. Note (1941) 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1911. Placing the test upon a
functional basis the author proceeded to admit, "It may be objected
that this leaves unanswered the major question as to what are the
functions of a corporate director or officer. In a period where
the role of the corporation and the corporate manager in our
national economy is undergoing decided changes and being critically
examined, this is perhaps more a virtue than a vice."
55. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
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fiction and the corporation can act only through its agents.
Thus, the rules most often involved concern the acceptance of
a power to act in a particular matter in behalf of another. The
agent is precluded from acting in his own behalf in that
matter.5 6
A director or manager is in closer relationship with his
corporation than is an employee; thus, the law of unfair
competition more clearly restricts his freedom of enterprise.
Consequently, the erring director may not entice away employees of the corporation,5 7 use corporate facilities and capital in development of competing enterprise,'5 actively prevent the corporation from competing, 9 or seize for himself
a corporate opportunity."0
In Meinhard v. Salmon," ' two joint venturers were bound
to each other by contract with respect to a lease out of
which a new business opportunity arose. The defendant,
who was in control with exclusive power of direction and
management, appropriated the new opportunity for himself.
The court held that the relationship so nearly approached
that of an express trust that it gave the plaintiff an expectancy in the new opportunity sufficient to impose a duty of
disclosure on the defendant. The doctrine of the case, however, in all of its implications, is much broader.
"While there is a lofty moral implicit in this rule, it actually
accomplishes a practical, beneficient purpose. It recognizes the
frailty of human nature; it realizes that where a man's imme-

diate fortunes are concerned, he may sometimes be subject to
a blindness often intuitive and compulsive.
56.

The rule is de-

Restatement, Agency, Neb. Annot. (1934) See. 39Z ff. Kroegher
v. Calivada Colonization Co., 119 Fed. 641 (C.C.A. 3d, 1920);
DuPont v. DuPont, 256 Fed. 129 (C.C.A. 3d, 1919); DeBardeliben

v. Bessermer Land & Improvement Co., 140 Ala. 621, 37 So. 511

(1904); Heiden Realty Co. v. Brown, 234 Mich. 578, 220 N.W.

699 (1928); Trenton Baking Co. v. McKelway, 8 N.J.Eq. 84 (1840);

Blake v. Buffalo Creek R.R., 56 N.Y. 485 (1874).
57. Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F. (2d) 236 (D.C.N.D.
58. Red Top Cab Co. v. Hanchett, 48 F. (2d) 236 (D.C.N.D.
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A. (2d) 503 (Del. 1939); Battle
Co. v. Kirkland, 298 Mich. 515, 299 N.W. 167 (1941).
59. In re New York Rys. Corp. 82 F. (2d) 739 (C.C.A.

Cal. 1931).

Cal. 1931);
Creek Food
8th, 1936);

Singer v. Carlisle, 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 172, affirmed 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 320
(1940); Blaunstein v. Pan Am. Petroleum & Trans. Co., 174 Misc.
601, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 651 (1940).

60. LaGarde v. Anniston Lime & Stone Co., 126 Ala. 496, 28 So. 199

(1900); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A. (2d) 503 (Del. 1939); Solimi v.

Hollander, 128 N.J. Eq. 228, 16 A. (2d) 203 (1941).
61. See, supra n. 55.
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signed on the one hand to prevent clouded conception of fidelity
and a moral indifference that blurs the vision, and on the other
hand, to stimulate the most luminous critical sense and the
finest exercise of judgment uncontaminated by dross of prejudice, of divided allegiance or of self interest."62
Obviously such an approach requires correlation into
the cases.
But first, it is important to note, that court
or jury might be influenced by the fiduciary position of a
director and therefore, find that an agency existed, that
acts of unfair competition were committed, that there was
active fraud, or, that the case falls within the rule of Meinhard v. Salmon, where under ordinary circumstances they
would have found to the contrary.
The proposition contended for is perhaps best substan3
tiated by the recent decisions of the New York courts,1
64
Thus, in Dunlop's Sons v. Dunlop, the court said,
"What we have in this case is a claim for the return to the
corporation of a loss suffered by the corporation. The amount
of the loss is the same as the so-called "profit" received by the
defaulting officers and directors. The wrong done to the company is no different from the wrong done to a corporation when
an excess salary is paid to an officer or when gifts are made
to strangers, or when bonuses are wrongfully paid."
5
Likewise, in Singer v. Carlisle,"
the court held that, "The
gist of the alleged wrongdoing was an improper diversion
of business from the plaintiff corporation. This amounts to
waste. Even if it be inferred that the director received
some benefit, the character of the cause of action would
still remain one of waste or negligence."
None of the cases attempt to define the so-called "good
faith" or determine what constitutes this "fiduciary relationship." Such statements in effect seem to assume the issue. 66
That the duties found in the cases are not duties resting
solely on the directorship relation is certainly substantiated
by the decisions.

62.
63.

64.
65.
66.

Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 667, 685 (1940).
Singer v. Carlisle, 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 172, affirmed 26 N.Y.S. (2d)
320 (1940); Dunlop's Sons v. Dunlop, 259 App. Div. 233, 18 N.Y.S.
(2d) 818 (1940); Davis v. Cohn 256 App. Div. 905, 9 N.Y.S. (2d)
881 (1939); Civerdinski v. Bent, 256 App. Div. 612, 11 N.Y.S.
(2d) 208 (1939), affirmed 28 N.Y. 782, 24 N.E. (2d) 475.
258 App. Div. 233, 234, 18 N.Y.S. (2d) 818, 819 (1940).
26 N.Y.S. (2d) 172, 178, affirmed 26 N.Y.S. (2d) 320 (1940).
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A. (2d) 503 (Del. Sup. 1939), affirming 2 A.
(2d) 225 (Del. Ch.).
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Among the leading cases allowing recovery, one and
often more of the above circumstances usually are present.
In Irving Trust Company v. Deutch,1" the offer of 200,000
shares of DeForest stock, while addressed to the directors
individually, was made with the knowledge of a requirement
of Board approval of stock purchases. Based on this and
other facts in evidence, the court found that the original offer was an offer to the corporation through the defendants
as agents. It was further conceded that access to the patents
controlled by the DeForest Company was essential to the
accomplishment of the corporate purpose.
Several of the cases have involved active prevention of
competition of the corporation company by its directors.',Similarly, it should be noted that the actual decision in
New York Trust Company v. American Realty Companywas based upon the fact that the pleadings might be construed as stating that the directors had bought land with
'
intent to resell to the corporation. In Haben v. Morris,70
before deciding for the plaintiff, the court determined that
the circumstances imposed upon the defendants a "mandate"
to buy for the company. In Coleman v. Hanger,71 two closed
corporations were involved. The plaintiff was a stockholder in the first. The defendants were directors and managers.
The defendants organized a second corporation under a
similar name to engage in the same business and did not
offer to the plaintiff any stock in this corporation. The
two corporations continued under the same management
and directorship, but all the cost-plus contracts were thereafter assigned to the new corporation, and the doubtful contracts were given to the old corporation. The action was
not brought by or on behalf of the old corporation, and the
decision rested largely on the freezing out of the plaintiff
from the new corporation. Likewise, while the court in
deciding Hall v. Dekker72 indulged in the customary broad
67. 73 F. (2d) 121 (C.C.A. 2d, 1934) certiorari denied 294 U.S. 708,
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

55 Sup. Ct. 405, 79 L.Ed. 1243.
In re New York Rys. Corp., 82 F. (2d) 739 (C.C.A. 8th, 1936).
244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E. 102 (1926).
255 App. Div. 35, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 721, affirmed 231 N.Y. 652, 22
N.E. (2d) 482 (1938).
210 Ky. 309, 275 S.W. 784 (1925).
45 Cal. App. (2d) 783, 115 P. (2d) 15 (1941).
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language, the case was decided upon the ground of unfair

competition.
All of these cases seem to fall within one of six classifications: agency, unfair competition, active fraud, waste,
negligence or non-feasance in office sufficient to constitute
corporate mismanagement, or tho doctrine of Meinhard v.
Salmon.- Added weight if given to this rationale is afforded by the cases in which the courts have refused to charge
directors with a violation of duty. 74 That such an approach is
valuable and not merely begging the issue seems obvious;
on the other hand, it is equally clear that the courts will
continue to talk in generalities and consider previous generalities of other courts, and so a conclusion in terms most
often used by the courts seems to be demanded.
The courts are reluctant to go beyond the application
of ordinary fiduciary rules. Doubtless this position is warranted, for if it were otherwise, competent men would be
dissuaded from assuming the burdens of corporate directorship.
Thus, if the director acquires a property interest in
anything in which the corporation already has an interest
sufficient to give it an "expectancy," or the defendant's acquisition will prevent or hinder the corporation in effecting
the purpose of its creation, the director will be held to have
violated his duties as director.7 5 Likewise, if by overreach73.

The case of Meinhard v. Salmon is not used as a cure-all, but as
effectively establishing as a concrete rule of law something at
which the courts had hinted for years.
74. These cases are sufficiently treated in the earlier parts of this
discussion.
75. It might be objected that the cases dealing with the purchase by
a director of the debts or outstanding obligations of the corporation
are not dealt with, or at least not sufficiently so. Such cases were
intentionally omitted due to the fact that in so far as they are
not distinguishable on the basis of the relationship between the
parties and their respective duties, the same principles as here
developed are applicable. The inclusion of such case in the text
of this treatment would add nothing constructive, but would only
contribute to confusion. However, for purposes of completeness
a brief statement of the law in this regard seems advisable.
The weight of authority seems to be that in the absence of
special circumstances sufficient to impose upon the director a
duty toward the corporation to have the claim discharged at the
time the purchase is made, such a purchase is permissable. Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Citizens Ice & Cold Storage Co.,
69 N.J.Eq. 718, 61 Atl. 529, affirmed 71 N.J.Eq. 221, 65 Atl. 980
(1905); Seymore v. Spring Forest Cemetary Assn., 144 N.Y. 333,
39 N.E. 365 (1895); Glenwood Mfg'r. Co. v. Syme, 109 Wisc. 355,
85 N.W. 432 (1901); McIntyre v. Ajax Mining Co., 28 Utah 162,
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ing the corporation, he acquires an interest which the corporation had contemplated or desired, or which was first
offered to the corporation, or to him in his corporate capacity, the court will find a violation of fiduciary duties. A
similar result should be reached if an officer or director
takes advantage to the detriment of his corporation, of his
knowledge gained by reason of his position and relation with
the corporation.71 And it should not be forgotten that if the
personal interests of a director become so antagonistic to
those of the corporation as to threaten the corporation's
well-being, it is the director's duty to resign, and he may be
77
compelled to do so.

76.

77.

77 Pac. 613 (1904). Contra: Hill v. Frazier, 22 Pa. 320 (1853).
In some jurisdictions it appears that among such special circumstances sufficient to impose a duty upon the director to act for
the corporation is the fact that the opportunity was to purchase
the claim below par. This is true at least to the extent that the
director should not be allowed to enforce them against the company for more than their cost to him. The Telegraph v. Lee, 125
Iowa 17, 98 N.W. 364 (1904); Wabunga Land Co. v. Schwanbeck,
245 Mich. 505, 22 N.W. 707 (managing director); see Martin v.
Chambers, 214 Fed. 769, 771 (C.C.A. 5th, 1914); In re AllenFoster-Willet Co., 227 Mass. 551, 116 N.E. 875, 866. Simlarly, a distinction seems to be drawn by some courts in the cases
involving "pure" directors from those involving officers or directorofficers. Davis v. Rock Creek L.F.&M. Co., 55 Cal. 059, 364 (1880)
(president); The Chouteau Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 74 Mo. 286, 291 (defendant's powers almost equal to those of a trustee). Under Sec.
16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, a director subject
thereto is prohibited from profiting from the sale of corporate
securities which he has held for less than six months.
Quare, to what extent these and other "corporate obligations"
cases can be tied in which the "corporate expectancy" cases, and
to what extent their authority adds suipport to the suggested
doctrine of Meinhard v. Salmon rationale. cf. In re McCrory
Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1935); Young v.
Columbia Land and Investment Co., 53 Ore. 43F, 99 Pac. 936
(1909); see Seymore v. Spring Forest Cemetary Ass'n., 144 N.Y.
333, 338, 39 N.E. 365, 367 (1895).
It is noteworthy that the cases wherein liability has been found
have involved rights or things of special or unique value to the
complainant, for example, necessary or much needed real estate,
a proprietary formula valuable to the corporation's business, competing enterprises or one required for the growth and expansion of
the corporation, and the like. Similarly noteworthy is the fact
that the courts have not often used such terms as "competing
business" after once determining that a corporate opportunity existed or failed to exist; and when such terms have been mentioned
the court proceeded to apply the usual rules of competitive business.
Golden Rod Mining Co. v. Buckvich, 108 Mont. 569, 92 P. (2d)
316, 320 (1939).

